





LA DÉCOUVERTE

Préface de Paulin Ismard

"Fair Greece! sad relic of departed worth! Immortal, though no more! though fallen, great!" Lord Byron, 1812





"Fair Greece! sad relic of departed worth! Immortal, though no more! though fallen, great!" Lord Byron, 1812



Why *great*? Why *fallen*? Why *immortal*?



"Immortal" -- survival, an intellectual heritage not forgotten.







"Great" – highly unusual era of economic and cultural *efflorescence**

*Goldstone, Jack. 2002. "Efflorescences and Economic Growth in World History." *Journal of World History.* 13:323-389.



"Great" – highly unusual era of economic and cultural *efflorescence*

> "Fallen" -the *premodern normal* condition of nearsubsistence



"Great" – highly unusual era of economic and cultural *efflorescence* (cf. Goldstone 2002)

> "Fallen" -the premodern normal condition of nearsubsistence

So: Why the rise? (whence efflorescence) Why the fall? (why not permanent efflorescence) Political and economic development in Greece over the long run

- Long run = ca. 1300 BCE (LBA) ca. 1900 CE
- "Core Greece" and "Greek world"

-- **Core Greece** = territory occupied by Greek state in 1890 (not Crete or Macedonia)



Political and economic development in Greece over the long run

- Run = ca. 1300 BCE (LBA) ca. 1900 CE
- "Core Greece" and "Greek world"
 - Core Greece = territory occupied by Greek state in 1890 (not Crete or Macedonia) or

-- **Greek world** = territory occupied by up to 1100 culturally Greek city-states (at maximum includes E Sicily, S Italy, W Anatolia, coastal Black Sea, scatter elsewhere in Mediterranean).



Core Greece. Development index, 1300 BCE to 1900 CE. (Population & consumption estimates broken out)



Core Greece. Development index, 1300 BCE to 1900 CE. (Population in millions x consumption in multiples of bare subsistence)



Core Greece. Development index, 1300 BCE to 1900 CE. (Population x consumption estimates)



Core Greece. Development index, 1300 BCE to 1900 CE. (Population x consumption estimates)



Core Greece. Development index, 1300 BCE to 1900 CE. Estimated population (millions) x consumption (multiples of subsistence)



Development index, Ca 400 BCE – 200 CE.

Lagia 2015. Protein intake in Athenian diet. Ca, 400 BCE – 200 CE



Lagia 2015. "Diet and the polis."



"Diachronic analysis of isotopic signatures in Athens demonstrates a **decline in protein levels from the Classical period to Imperial Roman times.** This was found to be **significant between the Classical and Hellenistic, and the Classical and Imperial Roman periods**, but not between the Hellenistic and Imperial Roman times."

Figure 4. Temporal comparison of δ^{13} C and δ^{15} N collagen values in Athens.

Shape of the Greek World:

A decentralized ecology of many small states.

The earth is very large and we [Greeks] ... live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs around a pond....

Plato Phaedo 109b

Shape of the Greek World: A decentralized ecology of many small states.

The earth is very large and we [Greeks] ... live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs around a pond....

http://polis.stanford.edu

Plato Phaedo 109b

OXFORD

AN INVENTORY OF ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL POLEIS

ATVONACIONES ENTOSENSAY TE ATVONACIONES ENTOSENSAY TE

MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN AND THOMAS HEINE NIELSEN

M. H. Hansen, T. Nielsen, *IACP* OUP 2004.

Encyclopedic inventory of **1035 poleis**, from 800=323 BCE.



OXFORD

AN INVENTORY OF ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL POLEIS

BIG DATA!

Editor by MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN AND THOMAS HEINE NIELSEN

M. H. Hansen, T. Nielsen, *IACP* OUP 2004.

Encyclopedic inventory of **1035 poleis**, from 800=323 BCE.

Now digitized by me and a team of current and former students.

- Dave Teegarden
- Tim Johnson
- Bailey McRae
- Mark Pyzyk
- Maya Krishnan

OXFORD

AN INVENTORY OF ARCHAIC AND CLASSICAL POLEIS

BIG DATA!

MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN AND THOMAS HEINE NIELSEN

M. H. Hansen, T. Nielsen, *IACP* OUP 2004.

Encyclopedic inventory of **1035 poleis**, from 800=323 BCE.

Now digitized by me and a team of current and former students.

- Dave Teegarden
- Tim Johnson
- Bailey McRae
- Mark Pyzyk
- Maya Krishnan

Data allows us to re-envision the Greek world as a market-like ecology of city-states











All *Inventory* poleis, ranked by size 5,6,7 = dark blue, 4 = mid-blue, 3 = light blue, 2 = red, 1 = orange, beige = size unknown

Size and Fame.

Similar truncated bell curves: Long right tails =

Many quite small and obscure states, few large and prominent.

Greek history as interaction between a few "super-poleis," several dozen mid-ranked poleis, and hundreds of small poleis. And, of course, non-Greek states and cultures.

Greek history is of "small and great poleis alike." Herodotus 1.5.3



Measuring economic change

Proxies for assessing economic performance

Relative measures (change over time)

- Demographic growth
- Size of houses
- Supply of coined money
- Investment in civic infrastructure

Measuring economic change

Proxies for assessing economic performance

Relative measures (change over time)

- Demographic growth
- Size of houses
- Supply of coined money
- Investment in civic infrastructure

Comparative measures (differences between societies)

- Population density
- Urbanization
- Median income/non-elite consumption
- Inequality of income and wealth

Change over time: More people

Greece, total population (in millions), 1000 - 300 BCE





MEDIAN HOUSE SIZE (ROOFED AREA, FLOOR PLAN, $m^2)$



Increased minting:

Dark red: Polis mints silver coins by 6th century BCE, Light red by 5th, Orange by 4th, Beige no known mint Data: *IACP*, corrected by Peter van Alfen (ANS).

More money in circulation



Numer of Coin Hoards and Coins in Hoards per Century

J. Ober/D. Teegarden. Data: IGCH

Bigger pots of money

Coin hoard size by century



More investment in civic infrastructure.



Summary of proxy-indicators of relative economic growth in the Greek world, 800-300 BCE. **Minimal conclusion: enough growth to demand explanation**

	Start date	End date	Multiplier
	(TI)	(T2)	(T2/T1)
Population	9th	4th	10-20
House floorplan	9th	4th	3.5
Household goods	9th	4th	5-10
Per capita consumption	9th	4th	1.5-2
Aggregate growth	9th	4th	15-20
Names (Attica)	6th	4th	14
Hoard size, median	6th	4th	2
Hoard size, average	6th	4th	4
Coins in hoards	5th	4th	3
Hoards, number	5th	4th	2
Population density (persons per square kilometer). Comparisons.



Non-Greek data: Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson 2011.

Urbanization. Comparisons (% of population in towns of >5000)



Premodern Europe data: Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson 2011











Athens and Holland, wheat wages. After Scheidel 2009.

	Wheat wage (liters/day)	Multiplier x survival	
Athens 4^{m} BC	<mark>13-16</mark>	<mark>3.7-4.6</mark>	
Holland 16 th -18 th CE	<mark>10-17</mark>	<mark>2.9-4.9</mark>	

Low Income Inequality. Athens.



Inequality extraction ratio % of maximum feasible inequality

Higher = more unequal.

(method and data for all but Athens: Milanovic and Williams 2010)

Preindustrial average	77
Roman Empire 14 CE	75
Holland 1561	76
France 1788	76
England & Wales 1688	57
Athens late 4 th BCE	53



Fig. 2. Pre-industrial Inequalities: Estimated Gini Coefficients, and the Inequality Possibility Frontiers

Summary of comparisons. Late classical Greece. Early modern Holland and England

Population	Urbanization %	Urbanization %	Per capita	Inequality
density (persons	(5000 standard)	(10,000	income (wheat	extraction ratio
per km²)		standard)	wage liters)	%
Greek world	Greek world	Greek world	Athens 5th - 4th	Athens
4 th BCE: 44	4 th BCE: 32	4 th BCE: 20-24	BCE: 9-16	4 th BCE: 53
Holland 1561:	Holland 1561:	Holland 1600:	Holland 16 th -	Holland 1561:
45	45	24.3	18 th CE: 10-17	76
England 1688:	England 1688:			England 1688:
44	13			57

Summary of comparisons. Late classical Greece. Early modern Holland and England

Population	Urbanization %	Urbanization %	Per capita	Inequality
density (persons	(5000 standard)	(10,000	income (wheat	extraction ratio
per km²)		standard)	wage liters)	%
Greek world	Greek world	Greek world	Athens 5 th - 4 th	Athens
4 th BCE: 44	4 th BCE: 32	4 th BCE: 20-24	BCE: 9-16	4 th BCE: 53
Holland 1651:	Holland 1651:	Holland 1600:	Holland 16 th -	Holland 1561:
45	45	24.3	18 th CE: 10-17	76
England 1688:	England 1688:			England 1688:
44	13			57





Summary of comparisons. Late classical Greece. Early modern Holland and England

Population	Urbanization %	Urbanization %	Per capita	Inequality
density (persons	(5000 standard)	(10,000	income (wheat	extraction ratio
per km²)		standard)	wage liters)	%
Greek world	Greek world	Greek world	Athens 5th - 4th	Athens
4 th BCE: 44	4 th BCE: 32	4 th BCE: 20-24	BCE: 9-16	4 th BCE: 53
Holland 1651:	Holland 1651:	Holland 1600:	Holland 16 th -	Holland 1561:
45	45	24.3	18 th CE: 10-17	76
England 1688:	England 1688:			England 1688:
44	13			57

?





Explaining Greek economic growth

Hypothesis:

Fairer <u>rules</u> (more equal & open access) and fiercer <u>competition</u> within a market-like ecology of states *incentivized capital investment* (human, social, financial) and *rewarded innovation* (by individuals and by states), while *lowering transaction costs*.



Prediction following from hypothesis:

Institutions featuring fair rules and offering competitive advantage will prove *adaptive*, and will be *widely adopted* across the ecology of Greek city-states.

Prediction following from hypothesis:

Institutions featuring fair rules and offering competitive advantage will prove *adaptive*, and will be *widely adopted* across the ecology of Greek city-states.

Many familiar features of Greek civilization are thus explained!

Specific predictions based on hypothesis

1. *Refinement* of fairness rules under competitive pressure & *convergence* of poleis upon adaptive institutions

- Democracy
- Federalism

2. Creative destruction: *Failure* of states *not* following path of convergence

- Sparta in 370s forward.
- Tyrant-dominated Sicily in mid-4th century

3. *Expansion* of polis world as adaptive polis institutions adopted by Greeks' neighbors.

- Caria
- Macedon

4. More *specialization*, more mobile specialists

Specific predictions based on hypotheses

1. Refinement of fairness rules under competitive pressure & convergence of poleis upon adaptive institutions

- Democracy
- Federalism

2. Creative destruction: Failure of states not following path of convergence

- Sparta in 370s forward.
- Tyrant-dominated Sicilian poleis in mid-4th century

3. Expansion of polis world as adaptive polis institutions adopted by Greeks' neighbors.

- Caria
- Macedon

4. More specialization, more mobile specialists

3 & 4 help precipitate "political fall" – i.e. Macedonian takeover.

1 & 2 help explain "immortality" – why Greek culture survives the political fall.

Athenian institutions explain high performance & democracy's robustness

Frequent innovations/refinements

- Law, administration of justice
- Legislative authority of Assembly
- Executive boards
- Taxation
- Military recruitment

Democracy ⇒ performance

Athenian institutions explain high performance & democracy's robustness

Frequent innovations/refinements

- Law, administration of justice
- Legislative authority of Assembly
- Executive boards
- Taxation
- Military recruitment

Democracy \Rightarrow **performance**

Yet certain institutions quite stable

- Quasi-federalism (Cleisthenic tribal system)
- Council of 500, People's courts

Democracy ⇒robustness

Democratic performance: State capacity tracks democracy



Athens. Capacity, democracy, population. 600-250 BC

Democratic robustness: recovery from shocks

Athens. Capacity, democracy, population. 600-250 BC



— Capacity ······ Democracy – – Population

Democratic robustness, resistance to shocks

Athens. Capacity, democracy, population. 600-250 BC



— Capacity ······ Democracy – + – Population

Constitutional Transitions in Greek Poleis, ca. 800 – 300 B.C. Row = transitions from. Column = transitions to.

Constitution	Basileia	Demokratia	Oligarchia	Politea	Tyrannis	Other	Total Transitions <i>From</i>
Basileia	1	1	6	0	3	0	11
Demokratia	1	0	41	0	15	2	59
Oligarchia	0	63	0	1	19	2	85
Politea	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
Tyrannis	1	26	17	0	1	1	46
Other	0	2	1	0	0	1	4
Total Transitions <i>To</i>	3	93	65	1	39	6	

Bottom line: Oligarchy lost ground to democracy

Row: Transition <u>from</u>. Column: transitions <u>to.</u>

Source: T. Johnson, Data IACP

Growth of Tyranny over time. White bars/orange line = tyranny.



David Teegarden, Death to Tyrants (PUP 2014)

Growth of democracy and oligarchy. Black bars/blue line = democracy. Gray bars/red line = oligarchy



David Teegarden, Death to Tyrants (PUP 2014)

Growth of democracy and oligarchy. Black bars/blue line = democracy. Gray bars/red line = oligarchy



David Teegarden, Death to Tyrants (PUP 2014)

Specific predictions based on hypotheses

1. Refinement of fairness rules under competitive pressure & convergence of poleis upon adaptive institutions

- Democracy
- Federalism

2. Creative destruction: Failure of states not following path of convergence

- Sparta in 370s forward.
- Tyrant-dominated Sicilian poleis in mid-4th century

3. Expansion of polis world as adaptive polis institutions adopted by Greeks' neighbors.

- Caria
- Macedon

4. More specialization, more mobile specialists

3 & 4 help precipitate "political fall" – i.e. Macedonian takeover.



Mausolus of Caria

Expansion of the Greek polis world: "The Opportunists"*



Philip II of Macedon



Evagoras and Nicocles of Cyprus

* J.K. Davies 1993

Alexander of Pherai



Stawomir Sprawski JASON OF PHERAE Sławomir Sprawski



Mausolus of Caria





Semi-independent Persian satrap of Caria (SW Anatolia: capital = Halicarnassus).

Actively promotes Hellenization of Carian cities.



Cities of Caria in later 4th century: Lighter = more Hellenized.

Data: IACP

See further: Debord 1999 Ma 2014

Explaining political fall.

Fall defined as the loss of full independence by most major poleis. 338-322 BCE: Macedonian conquest.

Why do Philip and Alexander succeed, when Darius and Xerxes of Persia failed in 490-478 BCE?





Not poverty: Hellas reaches it classical economic peak in later 4th c. BCE

Not poverty: Hellas reaches it classical economic peak in later 4th c.

Not decadence: Large Greek alliance mobilizes 32,000 cavalry & infantry – many more than for any Greek vs Greek battle of 5th or earlier 4th c BCE).

Not poverty: Hellas reaches it classical economic peak in later 4th c.

Not decadence: Large Greek alliance. Mobilization of hoplites and cavalry in Athenian/Theban led alliance at Chaeronea: ca. 32,000 – many more than for any other Greek v Greek battle of 5th or earlier 4th c BCE).

Disunity? Greece was *never* unified. Anti-Philip coalition is comparable or larger than larger the 31-state anti-Persian alliance.

Not poverty: Hellas reaches it classical economic peak in later 4th c.

Not decadence: Large Greek alliance. Mobilization of hoplites and cavalry in Athenian/Theban led alliance at Chaeronea: ca. 32,000 – many more than for any other Greek v Greek battle of 5th or earlier 4th c BCE).

Disunity? Greece was *never* unified. Anti- Philip coalition, with total population base of ca. 1 million (vs Philip's probable population base of 1.25-2 million) is comparable larger to the 31-state anti-Persian alliance.

Luck and genius: Philip survives serious wounds, has a long reign, a hugely competent successor, and is a military/organizational genius. But also ...

Explaining the fall. Market in specialization:

Highly skilled specialists in fields relevant to military and financial success are mobile and available for hire.

Philip and Alexander grasp the value of institutions and expertise developed within the market-like ecology. They selectively emulate and adapt Greek institutions, hire Greek experts, and drive innovations that make imperial Macedon in some ways "polis-like" (like Mausolus, unlike 5th c. Persian Kings).

Explaining the fall. Market in specialization:

Highly skilled specialists in fields relevant to military and financial success are mobile and available for hire.

Philip and Alexander grasp the value of institutions and expertise developed within the market-like ecology. They selectively emulate and adapt Greek institutions, hire Greek experts, and drive innovations that make imperial Macedon in some ways "polis-like" (like Mausolus, unlike 5th c. Persian Kings).

Thus, growing **specialization** and **transfer** of ideas, goods, and services within the polis ecology help to explain the fall *as well as the rise* of classical Greece.
Military:

- Training of citizen-like soldiers with personal stake in victory. *Sparta*.
- Deep infantry phalanx, organized mixed forces (infantry, cavalry, projectiles). *Thebes*.
- Trireme navy. Athens.
- Catapult technology, and driving further development. *Syracuse*.

Military:

- Training of citizen-like soldiers with personal stake in victory. *Sparta*.
- Deep infantry phalanx, organized mixed forces (infantry, cavalry, projectiles). *Thebes*.
- Trireme navy. *Athens*.
- Catapult technology, and driving further development. *Syracuse*.



... and of course, the sarissa

Military:

- Training of citizen-like soldiers with personal stake in victory. *Sparta*.
- Deep infantry phalanx, organized mixed forces (infantry, cavalry, projectiles). *Thebes*.
- Trireme navy. *Athens*.
- Catapult technology, and driving further development. *Syracuse*.



... and of course, the sarissa

Military:

- Training of citizen-like soldiers with personal stake in victory.
- Deep infantry phalanx, organized mixed forces (infantry, cavalry, projectiles). Thebes.
- Navy. Athens.
- Catapult technology, and driving further development. Syracuse.

Finance. Athens.

- Taxation (harbors, and League *syntaxis*). Mining technology.
- Large scale minting operations.
- Deficit financing/Sovereign debt?

Military:

- Training of citizen-like soldiers with personal stake in victory.
- Deep infantry phalanx, organized mixed forces (infantry, cavalry, projectiles). Thebes.
- Navy. Athens.
- Catapult technology, and driving further development. Syracuse.

Finance. Athens.

- Taxation (harbors, League *syntaxis*). Mining technology.
- Large scale minting operations.
- Deficit financing/Sovereign debt

"Callistratus [an Athenian politician], when in Macedonia [360s], caused the harbor-dues, which were usually sold for 20 talents, to produce twice as much. For noticing that only the wealthier men [among the Macedonians] were accustomed to buy them because the gurarantors for the twenty talents were obliged to show [provide collateral] talent for talent, he issued a proclamation that anyone might buy the dues on furnishing securities for one-third of the amount, or as much more as could be procured in each case." (Ps-Aristotle, Economics 2.1350a)

Military:

- Training of citizen-like soldiers with personal stake in victory.
- Deep infantry phalanx, organized mixed forces (infantry, cavalry, projectiles). Thebes.
- Navy. Athens.
- Catapult technology, and driving further development. Syracuse.

Finance. Athens.

- Taxation (harbors, League *syntaxis*). Mining technology.
- Large scale minting operations.
- Deficit financing/Sovereign debt (?)

Borrowed military innovations + financial innovations (+ genius and luck) = Macedonian takeover of the Greek world Explaining "Immortality"

What MIGHT have happened :

Explaining "Immortality"

What MIGHT have happened :





Explaining "Immortality"

Uh Oh...

00

Comparative thought experiment #2:



Premises:

Macedonian Successors to Alexander were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents.





Austin, M. M. 1986. "Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy." *Classical Quarterly.* 36:450-466.

Citing St. Augustine: "If there is no justice, what are kingdoms except large robber bands?"

Premises:

Macedonian Successors to Alexander were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).





?



Premises:

Macedonian Successors to Alexander were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).

Had they been able to plunder and set rents/taxes at will the classical economic efflorescence would have crashed, perhaps taking classical culture down with it.

Premises:

Macedonian Successors to Alexander were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).

Had they been able to plunder and set rents/taxes at will the classical economic efflorescence would have crashed, taking classical culture down with it.



Counter-factual Hellenistic Greek polis

Premises:

Macedonian Diadochi were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).

Had they been able to plunder and set rents/taxes at will the classical economic efflorescence would have crashed, perhaps taking classical culture down with it.



Actual Hellenistic Greek polis. Priene (restoration).

Premises:

Macedonian Diadochi were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).

Had they been able to plunder and set rents/taxes at will the classical economic efflorescence would have crashed, perhaps taking classical culture down with it.

In fact: There was no abrupt economic fall to match the political fall:

The Hellenistic Greek world flourished economically.

Polis culture flourished.

Many poleis had local autonomy.

Late 4th / 3rd century BCE is in some ways the high point of Greek democracy.

Taxes to Kings were negotiated rather than arbitrarily imposed.

Premises:

Macedonian Diadochi were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).

Had they been able to plunder and set rents/taxes at will the classical economic efflorescence would have crashed, perhaps taking classical culture down with it.

In fact: There was no abrupt economic fall to match the political fall:

The Hellenistic Greek world flourished economically.

Polis culture flourished.

Many poleis had local autonomy.

Late 4th / 3rd century BCE is in some ways the high point of Greek democracy. *Taxes to Kings were negotiated rather than arbitrarily imposed.*

Hypothesis: Warlord-Kings were constrained to negotiate high levels of independence and low rents/taxes because the Greek poleis were costly to attack. *The costs of attack were driven up (and thus Kings restrained) by federalism, democracy & fortifications.*

Premises:

Macedonian Diadochi were (mostly) warlords, with short time horizons, seeking plunder and rents (M.M. Austin 1986).

Had they been able to plunder and set rents/taxes at will the classical economic efflorescence would have crashed, perhaps taking classical culture down with it.



Actual Hellenistic Greek polis. Priene (restoration).

NOTICE THE BIG STONE WALL AROUND THE CITY & LOCATION ON A MOUNTAIN SIDE.

Key role of walls emphasized by Aristotle, Politics book 7

"...if the city is to survive and not to suffer disaster or insult, the securest fortification of walls must be deemed to be the most warlike..."







"... particularly in view of the inventions that have now been made in the direction of precision with missiles and artillery for sieges..."

Torsion catapult and mobile siege tower. Late 4th c. BCE



Torsion catapult and mobile siege tower. Late $4^{\rm th}$ c. BCE



"...but [potential aggressors] do not even start attempting to attack those who are well prepared."

...but [potential aggressors] do not even start attempting to attack those who are well prepared.

Payoffs to King, City and Elite.



Formalizing Aristotle's argument about walls and deterrence: King, City, Elite Game.

Payoffs to King, City and Elite.



<u>Conclusions</u>: Byron was right. And now we know why.

Rise/Great: Distinctive political choices, made under emerging conditions of fair rules and competition, create institutions (including democracy) that drive increased specialization, mobility, exchange: economic growth.

Conclusions: Byron was right. And now we know why.

Rise/Great: Distinctive political choices, made under emerging conditions of fair rules and competition, create institutions (including democracy and federalism) that drive increased specialization, mobility, exchange: economic growth.

Fall/Fallen: Mobile specialists are available for hire by "opportunists," leading eventually to Macedonian takeover.

Conclusions: Byron was right. And now we know why.

Rise/Great: Distinctive political choices, made under emerging conditions of fair rules and competition, create institutions (including democracy) that drive increased specialization, mobility, exchange: economic growth.

Fall/Fallen: Mobile specialists are available for hire by "Opportunists," leading eventually to Macedonian takeover.

Persistence/Immortality: Those same choices and institutions helped preserve Greek culture during the early Hellenistic period, after the "political fall."

The low taxes and continued polis independence that arose from the "City, King, Elite Game" allowed continued economic flourishing, preserved the conditions necessary for the consolidation and expansion of classical Greek culture.

Greek culture was available for Roman uptake in 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE. And ultimately for us.

Colossus of Rhodes: victory monument commemorating successful defense in siege, 305 BCE





Not all 1035 "Greek poleis" in *IACP* are homogeneously Greek in culture...





IACP poleis: **Hellenicity**.

Tan = fully Greek. Orange = some non-Greek features. Red: strong non-Greek features; light beige = unknown.

Not all 1035 "Greek poleis" in *IACP* are homogeneously Greek in culture...

... or certainly attested to be poleis





Inventory poleis: **"Polis status certainty"** Tan = attested as polis; orange to maroon, less certainly attested